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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
WESTERN DIVISION
Elizabeth Wells





O R D E R
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Cincinnati
Children's Hospital Medical Center's motion for summary judgment 
(Doc. No. 23). For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion 
for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
nurse in Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center's 
("CCHMC") bone marrow transplant unit but from 2003 to 2009 she 
worked in the Critical Airway Transplant Surgery unit. Plaint. 
Dep. at 10. The record rather vaguely defines this department's 
function as caring for transplant patients and high-acuity, i.e., 
seriously ill, patients. Keegan Dep. at 16. Plaintiff's duties 
within the Critical Airway are similarly ill-defined except that 
they obviously involved patient care and included such tasks as 
properly documenting patient records, administering narcotic 
medication, changing ostomy bags and dressings, starting IV's,
I. Background
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and briefing the on-coming shift nurses as to the status of her 
patients. See generally Doc. No. 42-1, at 15-18. Plaintiff 
consistently received good performance evaluations in the 
Critical Airway unit.
In 2008, Plaintiff began to experience gastrointestinal 
problems, including pain, vomiting, and diarrhea. The vomiting 
and diarrhea caused Plaintiff to become dehydrated and experience 
an electrolyte imbalance. Plaintiff underwent some procedures 
in 2008 to address these symptoms, including a cholecystecomy and 
removal of her gall bladder. At various times, Plaintiff was 
prescribed oxycodone and morphine for pain. Doc. No. 25-2, at 
13.
Plaintiff applied for and received intermittent leave 
under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") for the period 
September 2, 2008 through March 4, 2009. Doc. No., 25-4, at 6-7. 
She applied for and received continuous FMLA leave for the period 
November 5, 2008 through November 30, 2008. Doc. No. 25-4, at 8­
10. Plaintiff's request for renewal of intermittent FMLA leave 
for the period March 4, 2009 through September 4, 2009 was also 
approved. Doc. No. 25-4, at 12.
In January 2009, Plaintiff advised her supervisors, 
Debra Ballinger and Lisa Keegan, that she had been prescribed and 
was taking morphine. CCHMC's policy is that it is permissible 
for an employee to take prescription medication while on duty so
2
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long as it does not affect her ability to perform her job. 
Ballinger Dep. (Doc. No. 26) at 39-41; Doc. No. 32-2, at 35.
In May 2009, Ballinger became aware of several 
instances of unusual or erratic behavior on Plaintiff's part that 
called into question, at least in her mind, Plaintiff's fitness 
to practice in the unit. These incidents include:
1. documenting ostomy care on a patient that did not 
have an ostomy.
2. going to the wrong room to start an IV.
3. providing a jumbled and confused report at the end 
of her shift.
3. asking her immediate supervisor if she wanted to 
go to lunch with a nurse who had left several 
hours earlier.
4. discussing with a charge nurse a patient who was 
being discharged when in actuality there was no 
patient being discharged.
5. pulling morphine for a patient who had no order 
for morphine.
6. calling in sick one morning and then reporting to 
work anyway, and then denying that she had called 
in sick in the first place.
Ballinger Dep. at 59-62; Doc. No. 42-1 at 15-48. While 
Plaintiff has explanations for all of these incidents, she does
3
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not deny that they occurred. Plaint. Dep. at 32-36. Plaintiff 
in fact admits that she felt ill and was confused for about a 
four hour block of time in late April 2009. Id. at 68.
Plaintiff also admitted that she "blacked out a little bit," id., 
that she "felt like I was out of my body," and that she "was 
extremely confused and dizzy." Doc. No. 25-4, at 38. Plaintiff 
also admits in her brief that at this time she was taking 
Lotronex for her gastrointestinal condition, which has "dangerous 
side effects, including neurological ones like confusion, 
sedation, and equilibrium disorders." Doc. No. 38, at 11 
(internal parentheses omitted)
In any event, these incidents cause Ballinger to 
consider whether they were just errors, whether Plaintiff was 
impaired because of her prescriptions, or whether she was 
diverting drugs. Ballinger Dep. at 70; Doc. No. 42-1, at 15. 
CCHMC, however, rather quickly ruled out drug diversion as the 
cause of Plaintiff's behavior. Rodell Dep. at 22; Doc. No. 32-2, 
at 44. An audit of the pyxis dispensing machine showed that her 
access was within normal limits and another nurse had witnessed 
her destruction of the morphine she had removed without an order. 
Doc. No. 42-1, at 4. Ballinger, Keegan, and Terri Thrasher, 
Director of the Employee Health Department, and Maria Rodell, 
Director of Employee Relations and Compliance, determined that 
the appropriate course of action was to suspend Plaintiff without
4
Case: 1:10-cv-00619-SSB-SKB Doc #: 50 Filed: 02/15/12 Page: 5 of 44 PAGEID #: <pageID>
pay pending completion of a fitness-for-duty examination 
performed by CCHMC's third-party employee assistance plan ("EAP") 
provider, CONCERN.
Plaintiff was suspended on May 19, 2009 and referred to 
CONCERN. She was also required to submit to a breathalyzer test 
and provide a urine sample for a drug test. Doc. No. 42-1, at 
16; Doc. No. 25-4, at 14. Plaintiff in fact tested positive for 
two different controlled substances but she was considered to 
have passed the drug test because the levels were within the 
limits of her prescriptions. Thrasher Dep. at 51-58. There was 
concern, nevertheless, that the amount of medication 
Plaintiff was taking affected her ability to practice safely.
Id. at 54-55.
CONCERN referred Plaintiff to Dr. Michael Miller for a 
psychiatric evaluation. Dr. Miller provided a report to CONCERN 
dated May 27, 2009. Doc. No. 25-4, at 15-22. In addition to 
interviewing Plaintiff and having her complete an MMDP-2 test,
Dr. Miller contacted her other health care providers, and 
obtained a list of her recent prescription fills. Dr. Miller's 
conclusions were damning. Dr. Miller felt that Plaintiff 
downplayed the seriousness of the events leading to her referral 
and that she was deceptive and in denial about her use of 
opiates, had little insight into her behaviors, was doctor­
5
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shopping and had been engaging in drug-seeking behavior. Dr.
Miller's ultimate conclusion was:
I do not believe that she should be allowed to work in 
a clinical setting considering the documented problems 
in the referral packet and the persistent use of 
opiates and Apidex. She poses a critical risk to her 
patients in light of the problems documented by the 
CCHMC staff. She has not managed her medical condition 
in a mature and responsible manner. Instead, she has 
misused and abused opiates, which is of even greater 
concern considering that she had an incident at work 
which involved morphine. Her prognosis is guarded due 
to her minimalization, denial, and out-and-out 
dishonesty. Chemical dependency treatment is critical 
at this juncture.
Doc. No. 25-4, at 21 (emphasis in original).
On June 5, 2009, as a condition of remaining employed, 
CCHMC required Plaintiff to enter into a return-to-work 
agreement. Doc. No. 32-5, at 19. The agreement required 
Plaintiff to complete a treatment program indicated by CONCERN, 
take FMLA leave until completion of treatment, follow all the 
recommendations of CONCERN and the treatment provider, and submit 
to random drug testing for at least a period of two years. Id. 
CCHMC also required Plaintiff to take FMLA leave during her 
absence while fulfilling the return-to-work conditions.
Based on Dr. Miller's report, CONCERN referred 
Plaintiff to Recovery Works for a drug test and chemical 
dependency assessment. Doc. No. 25-3, at 9. Plaintiff's drug 
screen was negative for opiates, methamphetamines, cannabis, 
cocaine, and benzodiazapines. Doc. No. 25-2, at 29. The written
6
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assessment of the chemical dependency counselor, Ed Tedder, dated 
June 16, 2009, while not as harsh as Dr. Miller's report, 
nevertheless had a guarded tone. Tedder stated that, based on 
Plaintiff's statements during the evaluation, he could not give a 
clear opinion as to abuse or dependency although he did note that 
some of her medications could have contributed to her aberrant 
behavior. Id. Thus, Tedder provided no diagnosis but 
recommended that Plaintiff participate in outpatient substance 
abuse counseling to rule out abuse or dependence and to educate 
Plaintiff on the effects on cognitive functioning of opiod use 
and other prescription medications. Id. Tedder also recommended 
that upon returning to work, Plaintiff be monitored closely and 
subjected to random drug screens. He also recommended that 
Plaintiff be restricted from access to opiod medications and that 
she be directly supervised if she were permitted to administer 
pain medications. Id.
CONCERN also referred Plaintiff to Dr. Richard Baum, a 
psychologist, for substance abuse counseling. Dr. Baum provided 
a report to CONCERN dated July 7, 2009, after two counseling 
sessions with Plaintiff. Doc. No. 25-4, at 40. Dr. Baum 
indicated that Plaintiff presented cogent arguments supporting 
her contention that her use of prescription medications was 
misconstrued as abuse. Dr. Baum also indicated, however, that 
Plaintiff understood why CCHMC was concerned that her health and
7
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prescribed medications were negatively affecting her job. Dr. 
Baum stated that Plaintiff agreed to continue with counseling in 
order to support her return to work. Dr. Baum concluded, 
however, that Plaintiff could return to work immediately while 
treatment continued and that there was nothing in her current 
behavior or affect that precluded her from performing her job.
The only restriction that Dr. Baum included was that Plaintiff be 
subjected to drug screens for three months and that counseling be 
terminated if they were all negative. Id.
Having received both Dr. Miller's report and Dr. Baum's 
report, Plaintiff's CONCERN liaison, Barry Cobb, provided CCHMC 
with his own list of recommendations on July 13, 2009. Doc. No. 
25-3, at 9-10. Cobb recommended that if CCHMC accepted Dr.
Baum's opinion that Plaintiff was able to return to work, that 
she have a drug screen on her first day. Cobb further 
recommended that Plaintiff submit six drug screens a year for two 
years. Furthermore, "[i]n view of the episodes (i.e. confusion, 
errors in patient care) at work that initiated the fitness for 
duty referral," Cobb recommended that Plaintiff be closely 
monitored by her supervisors. Id.
On August 25, 2009, Dr. Baum provided a follow-up 
report to CONCERN stating that he and Plaintiff had mutually 
agreed to terminate counseling because she was not prepared to 
admit that she had a substance abuse problem. Doc. No. 25-1, at
8
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43. Dr. Baum noted that Plaintiff remained adamant that she had 
not abused her prescriptions and that he was unable to "develop 
the therapeutic alliance that would help determine the validity 
of her allegations, or to help her make the behavioral changes 
her employer was hoping for." Id.
On September 3, 2009, Plaintiff's own physician, Dr. 
Grogan, provided a note stating that she could return to work 
without restrictions. Doc. No. 25-4, at 43.
It is not clear on this record if there was ever a 
formal decision by CCHMC that Plaintiff had satisfactorily 
completed the fitness-for-duty evaluation or, if there was, who 
made it. The record does reflect that beginning on September 9, 
2009, Mary Bellman, an internal recruiter for CCHMC, began 
searching for a placement for Plaintiff in another department. 
Doc. No. 25-6, at 4. Neither Ballinger or Keegan, it is fair to 
say, was convinced that Plaintiff's completion of the fitness- 
for-duty evaluation enabled her to work in the Critical Airway 
unit. Both Ballinger and Keegan testified that they told human 
resources that they did not want Plaintiff back in their unit 
unless she could take care of her patients safely. Ballinger 
Dep. at 101-05; Keegan Dep. at 45-46. Ballinger in particular 
indicated that she believed that Plaintiff had not successfully 
addressed her health issues, which, in turn, caused her to
9
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believe that it was unsafe for Plaintiff to return to the 
Critical Airway unit. Ballinger Dep. at 102-04.
Plaintiff filled some temporary and less than full-time 
positions before obtaining her present position in the bone 
marrow transplant unit. In November 2009, Plaintiff worked in 
the flu clinic for two weeks administering flu shots. Then 
Plaintiff was assigned a position as a home health care nurse for 
a period of about six months. Both of these positions paid a 
lower hourly rate than she was earning in the Critical Airway 
unit. Plaintiff applied for a number of other positions within 
CCHMC during this time without success. See generally Doc. No. 
25-6.
In addition to completing the fitness-for-duty 
evaluation, CCHMC required Plaintiff to self-report her 
suspension to the Ohio Board of Nursing ("OBN"). CCHMC also 
provided two reports on Plaintiff's suspension. On July 22,
2009, CCHMC submitted a report which summarized all of the 
incidents leading up to Plaintiff's suspension, its investigation 
into the incidents, and her referral for chemical dependency 
treatment. Doc. No. 42-1, at 4. The report stated that 
Plaintiff had tested positive for oxycodone and oxymorphine but 
failed to note that she had prescriptions for these drugs. Id.
On September 10, 2009, Rodell, on behalf of CCHMC, 
provided a follow-up report to the OBN on Plaintiff's suspension.
10
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Plaintiff contends that this report had several false and 
defamatory statements in it, including a statement that 
Plaintiff's medical status was unknown despite the fact that she 
had been cleared to return to work and that "all" of the mental 
health professionals recommended that she not work in a clinical 
setting or under strict supervisory conditions, when in fact Dr. 
Baum placed no restrictions on her return to work. Doc. No. 42­
1, at 5-7; Rodell Dep. at 97 (admitting that Dr. Baum placed no 
restrictions on Plaintiff's return to work).1
Plaintiff persistently maintained that she was not 
abusing her prescriptions throughout the fitness-for-duty 
evaluation. On May 29, 2009, Plaintiff emailed Keegan and 
Ballinger complaining that the process was taking too long. She 
maintained that she was not intoxicated at work and was not a 
drug user. She complained that she was being treated unfairly 
because she was sick at work one day. Doc. No. 25-4, at 23.
On May 30, 2009, Plaintiff emailed Thrasher vehemently 
objecting to Dr. Miller's assessment and report and explaining 
her course of treatment for her gastrointestinal problems. Doc. 
No. 25-4, at 24-27. Plaintiff sent another email objecting to
1 Plaintiff also claims that in August 2010, during a 
substance abuse training class, an instructor impliedly referred 
to her as a nurse who was diverting and abusing drugs. As 
explained further, infra at 42-43, it is clear that this 
contention is based on hearsay and will not withstand summary 
judgment.
11
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Dr. Miller's report to Ballinger on June 17, 2009. Doc. No. 25­
4, at 30-32. On June 19, 2009, Plaintiff sent an email to 
Thrasher requesting copies of all of the medical reports from the 
fitness-for-duty evaluation. Doc. No. 25-4, at 34. Plaintiff 
also wrote, "I feel like I am being discriminated against because 
I have been sick." Id. In October 2009, one of Plaintiff's 
attorneys wrote a letter to CCHMC expressing concern that CCHMC 
was treating Plaintiff unfairly because of her "chronic illness" 
and her medication. Doc. No. 42-1, at 11.
Plaintiff filed a complaint charging disability 
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
in January 2010. Doc. No. 25-3, at 27-29. In September 2010, 
Plaintiff filed the instant complaint against CCHMC for alleged 
violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 
U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., the Ohio Civil Rights Act, Ohio Rev.
Code Chapter 4112, and the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 
U.S.C. § 2615, et seq. Specifically, Counts I through IV of the 
complaint allege that CCHMC violated the ADA and the Ohio Civil 
Rights Act by discriminating against Plaintiff on the basis of 
disability, by retaliating against her, and by failing to 
accommodate her. Count V of the complaint alleges that CCHMC 
violated the FMLA by retaliating against Plaintiff and by not 
reinstating her to her former position on return from FMLA leave.
12
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Counts VI and VII of the complaint assert state law claims for 
defamation and invasion of privacy, respectively.
At the conclusion of discovery, CCHMC filed the instant 
motion for summary judgment which is now ready for disposition.
II. Summary Judgment Standard of Review
The court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a). An assertion of a undisputed fact must be 
supported by citations to particular parts of the record, 
including depositions, affidavits, admissions, and interrogatory 
answers. The party opposing a properly supported summary 
judgment motion "'may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (internal quotation
omitted).
The Court is not duty bound to search the entire record 
in an effort to establish a lack of material facts. Guarino v. 
Brookfield Township Trs. , 980 F.2d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 1992). 
Rather, the burden is on the non-moving party to "present 
affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for 
summary judgment," Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 
1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989), and to designate specific facts in
13
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dispute. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. The non-moving party "must 
do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as 
to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The court construes the 
evidence presented in the light most favorable to the non-movant 
and draws all justifiable inferences in the non-movant's favor. 
United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The court's function is not to weigh the evidence and 
determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there 
is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The 
court must assess "whether there is the need for trial — whether, 
in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that 
properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they 
may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 
250. "If the evidence is merely colorable, . . . or is not
significantly probative, . . . the court may grant judgment."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
III. Analysis
A. Americans with Disabilities Act/Ohio Civil Rights Act 
1. Disability Discrimination 
Plaintiff presents disability discrimination and 
retaliation claims pursuant to the ADA and the Ohio Civil Rights 
Act. The alleged discriminatory acts in this case occurred after 
January 1, 2009; therefore the Americans With Disabilities Act
14
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Amendments Act of 2008 ("ADAAA") applies in this case.
Milholland v. Sumner County Bd. of Educ., 569 F.3d 562, 566-67 
(6th Cir. 2009). In order to establish a claim for disability 
discrimination, the plaintiff must first establish that she is 
"disabled" within the meaning of the Act. McKay v. Toyota Motor 
Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 371 (6th Cir. 1997).
Under the ADAAA, "disability" means:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities of such 
individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as 
described in paragraph (3)).
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Subsection 3 further defines the meaning 
of "regarded as having an impairment":
For purposes of paragraph (1)(C):
(A) An individual meets the requirement of "being 
regarded as having such an impairment" if the 
individual establishes that he or she has been 
subjected to an action prohibited under this 
chapter because of an actual or perceived physical 
or mental impairment whether or not the impairment 
limits or is perceived to limit a major life 
activity.
(B) Paragraph (1)(C) shall not apply to impairments 
that are transitory and minor. A transitory 
impairment is an impairment with an actual or 
expected duration of 6 months or less.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3). In contrast to the pre-amendment statute,
under the ADAAA, a plaintiff proceeding under the "regarded as"
prong only has to prove the existence of an impairment to be
15
Case: 1:10-cv-00619-SSB-SKB Doc #: 50 Filed: 02/15/12 Page: 16 of 44 PAGEID #: <pageID>
covered under the Act; she no longer is required to prove that 
the employer regarded her impairment as substantially limiting a 
major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.02(g)(3) ("the 
'regarded as' prong of the definition of disability . . . does
not require a showing of an impairment that substantially limits 
a major life activity or a record of such an impairment."). 
Similarly, the Ohio Civil Rights Act does not require an 
individual alleging that her employer regarded her as disabled to 
show that the employer also believed that the perceived 
disability limits a major life activity. Ohio Rev. Code § 
4112.01(13)("'Disability' means a physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more major life activities, 
including the functions of caring for one's self, performing 
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, 
learning, and working; a record of a physical or mental 
impairment; or being regarded as having a physical or mental 
impairment."); Scalia v. Aldi, Inc., No. 25436, 2011 WL 6740756, 
at *7-*8 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011).
There is sufficient evidence in the record to 
demonstrate to a reasonable juror that CCHMC regarded Plaintiff 
as disabled and took adverse employment action against the 
Plaintiff on the basis of a perceived disability. In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court views the evidence as reflecting two 
discrete instances of adverse employment action, one which
16
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clearly was not discriminatory and one which a reasonable juror 
could find was discriminatory.
The first adverse employment action was Plaintiff's 
suspension in May 2009. A reasonable juror, however, could not 
find that CCHMC's initial decision to suspend Plaintiff pending 
the completion of a fitness-for-duty evaluation was due to 
discriminatory animus. As CCHMC correctly points out in its 
brief, an employer is entitled to require an employee to undergo 
a medical examination to determine the cause of the employee's 
aberrant behavior. Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 
804, 810 (6th Cir. 1999). In this case, while Plaintiff provides 
explanations for the incidents that led CCHMC to suspend her, she 
does not dispute that they occurred or that they were a 
legitimate cause for concern by her supervisors. Even Plaintiff 
admits that she blacked out for a four hour period and that the 
Lotronex she was taking at the time causes "dangerous side 
effects, including neurological ones like confusion, sedation, 
and equilibrium disorders." Doc. No. 38, at 11. It seems beyond 
any serious argument that a nurse cannot safely treat patients if 
she is taking medication which causes or may cause her to black 
out and become confused or disoriented. CCHMC was entitled to 
find out the cause of Plaintiff's practice errors and apparent 
lapses in judgment without violating the ADA. Id. at 810-13. To 
the extent that Plaintiff's federal and state disability
17
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discrimination claims are based on the initial determination to 
suspend her pending a fitness-for-duty evaluation, CCHMC's motion 
for summary judgment is well-taken and is GRANTED.2
The second adverse employment action was CCHMC's 
determination not to reinstate Plaintiff to the Critical Airway 
unit when she returned to work in September 2009.3 At a minimum, 
this action was adverse because Plaintiff was only able to work 
for a reduced amount of hours and at a significant pay cut. 
Moreover, Plaintiff's assignment to administer flu shots and work 
in home health care was likely adverse because these jobs were 
less distinguished and carried less responsibility than her job 
in the Critical Airway unit. Tepper v. Potter, 505 F.3d 508, 515 
(6th Cir. 2007) ("A materially adverse change might be indicated
by a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a 
decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a 
material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material 23
2 Federal and state disability discrimination claims are
subject to the same evidentiary standards and may be evaluated 
concurrently. Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 
201 (6th Cir. 2010).
3 The Court also discusses the issue of Plaintiff's 
reinstatement to her former position in the context of her FMLA 
interference claim, infra, at 32-36. However, whether Plaintiff 
was entitled to restoration under the FMLA has no bearing on 
whether CCHMC discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of 
disability by not restoring her to the Critical Airway unit. See 
29 C.F.R. § 825.216(c)(FMLA regulations on employee's right to 
restoration)(stating that even if employee has no right to 
restoration under the FMLA, an employer's obligation to reinstate 
employee to position may be governed by the ADA).
18
Case: 1:10-cv-00619-SSB-SKB Doc #: 50 Filed: 02/15/12 Page: 19 of 44 PAGEID #: <pageID>
responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a 
particular situation.").
In their briefs, the parties discuss Plaintiff's 
disability discrimination claims in the context of the McDonnell 
Douglas framework for analyzing indirect evidence of 
discrimination. The Court, however, finds that the record 
contains direct evidence that CCHMC perceived Plaintiff as being 
disabled and denied her reinstatement on that basis. "[D]irect 
evidence of discrimination does not require a factfinder to draw 
any inferences in order to conclude that the challenged 
employment action was motivated at least in part by prejudice 
against members of the protected group." Johnson v. Kroger Co. 
319 F.3d 858, 865 (6th Cir. 2003). In this case, Ballinger 
indicated in her deposition that Plaintiff's impairment or 
impairments formed the basis of the decision not to reinstate her 
to the Critical Airway unit. Ballinger Dep. at 102-04.4
4 Ballinger testified in part as follows:
Q. Isn't that what the whole Fitness for Duty 
process is all about, to your understanding, 
deciding whether someone is safe or not to 
return to duty?
A. That's my understanding.
Q. And from your perspective, you didn't care 
one way or other whether the Fitness for Duty 
folks decided whether she was safe to return or 
not, you didn't want her back?
19
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Additionally, Rodell's follow-up report to the OBN indicates that 
Plaintiff's health-related problems were the reason she was not 
reinstated to the Critical Airway unit. Rodell told the OBN that 
"[t]he risk of Ms. Wells repeating past errors and reverting to 
the behaviors that gave rise to her fitness for duty assessment 
is not one the management of A4North Surgery is willing to 
accept." Doc. No. 42-1, at 6. This evidence directly shows that 
CCHMC believed that Plaintiff's health condition precluded her 
from performing as a nurse in the Critical Airway unit.
Since there is direct evidence that Plaintiff's 
impairment or impairments were the reason she was not reinstated 
to the Critical Airway unit, the McDonnell Douglas burden- 
shifting format does not apply. Monette v. Electronic Data Sys., 
Inc., 90 F.3d 1173, 1184 (6th Cir. 1996). Rather, when there is 
direct evidence that the employer relied on the employee's 
disability in making an adverse employment decision, in order to
A. It was not whether or not they decided she 
was ready to come back, it was that she was still 
having medical issues, and those issues had caused 
her to have practice issues, or could have 
caused her to have practice issues.
Q. Are you suggesting that she wasn't capable 
of doing the job at that point in time?
A. I'm suggesting that I wasn't sure if she 
was capable of doing the job at that time.
Ballinger Dep. at 104 (emphasis added).
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prevail on a disability discrimination claim, the plaintiff must 
prove that she is "disabled" within the meaning of the act and 
that she was otherwise qualified for the position with or without 
a reasonable accommodation, or with a alleged essential job 
function eliminated. Id. at 1186. If the plaintiff proves those 
two elements, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate 
that the challenged job criterion is essential or that a proposed 
accommodation will impose an undue hardship upon the employer.
Id. Additionally, by statute, an employer has available an 
affirmative defense that employing the individual in the position 
in question will "pose a direct threat to the health and safety 
of other individuals in the workplace." 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b); 
see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). In this case, there is 
sufficient evidence for Plaintiff to meet her burden of proof on 
the first two elements.
First, there is sufficient evidence for a juror to find
that CCHMC regarded Plaintiff as being disabled. As discussed
above, under the "regard as" prong, a plaintiff only needs to
show that she has an impairment; she does not need to show that
the impairment substantially limits a major life activity. A
physical or mental impairment is:
(1) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic 
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more 
body systems, such as neurological, musculoskeletal, 
special sense organs, respiratory (including speech 
organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive,
21
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genitourinary, immune, circulatory, hemic, lymphatic, 
skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as an 
intellectual disability (formerly termed "mental 
retardation"), organic brain syndrome, emotional or 
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.20(h). The gastrointestinal problems which
caused Plaintiff nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea clearly qualify
as a physiological disorder. Moreover, to the extent that the
side effects of Plaintiff's proper use of prescription medication
adversely affected her ability to work, it would contribute to a
finding that she was disabled. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) ("Looking at the Act as a whole, it is
apparent that if a person is taking measures to correct for, or
mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those
measures-both positive and negative-must be taken into account
when judging whether that person is 'substantially limited' in a
major life activity and thus 'disabled' under the Act.").5 And,
despite Dr. Miller's report, there is evidence that Plaintiff's
5 The ADAAA only overruled Sutton to the extent that the 
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures may not be taken into 
consideration in determining whether an individual is disabled. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E). Even after the enactment of the 
ADAAA, the negative effects of mitigating measures are still a 
relevant consideration in determining whether an individual is 
disabled. See Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2(b)(2)(2008) (Statement of 
Purposes for the ADAAA)("to reject the requirement enunciated by 
the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 
471 (1999) and its companion cases that whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined 
with reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating 
measures[.]").
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use of prescription medication was appropriate. The results of 
Plaintiff's first drug test were within the limits of her 
prescription and the second drug test detected no opiods or other 
controlled substances at all. To the extent that Plaintiff's 
blackout, confusion, and disorientation were caused by Lotronex, 
these would obviously be negative side affects of her attempts to 
ameliorate her gastrointestinal condition. Accordingly, the 
record establishes sufficiently that Plaintiff is or was disabled 
within the meaning of the ADAAA.
Second, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable 
juror to conclude that Plaintiff was qualified to work in the 
Critical Airway unit, even without a reasonable accommodation. 
Plaintiff worked successfully as a nurse in the unit for a number 
of years prior to 2009. Plaintiff's gastrointestinal problems 
were apparently adequately accommodated in 2008 by taking 
intermittent FMLA leave. During the first few months of 2009, 
Plaintiff apparently was able to perform her job safely and 
successfully even after she started on a prescription for 
morphine. There is evidence to suggest that Plaintiff's aberrant 
behavior at work coincided with starting on Lotronex and stopped 
when she stopped taking Lotronex. As early as July 2009, Dr.
Baum stated that Plaintiff could return to work without any 
restrictions at all. All of these facts show that Plaintiff was 
qualified to work in the Critical Airway unit upon her return
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from the fitness-for-duty evaluation. Thus, the evidence
supports that Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of
disability discrimination.
Although not articulated as such by CCHMC, the
principal issue with respect to Plaintiff's disability
discrimination claim is to what extent her medical condition
and/or use of prescription medicine presented a direct threat to
the health and safety of the patients. As indicated above, the
burden to show that the individual presents a direct threat to
the health and safety of others is on the employer. Regulations
issued by the EEOC explain this defense:
Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial 
harm to the health or safety of the individual or 
others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by 
reasonable accommodation. The determination that an 
individual poses a "direct threat" shall be based on an 
individualized assessment of the individual's present 
ability to safely perform the essential functions of 
the job. This assessment shall be based on a 
reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most 
current medical knowledge and/or on the best available 
objective evidence. In determining whether an 
individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to 
be considered include:
(1) The duration of the risk;
(2) The nature and severity of the potential harm;
(3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; 
and
(4) The imminence of the potential harm.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). In light of § 1630.2(r), the Court finds 
that CCHMC is not entitled to summary judgment on the "direct
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threat" affirmative defense. See, e.q., Braqdon v. Abbott, 524 
U.S. 624, 647 (1998) ("drawing guidance" from EEOC regulations
interpreting the ADA to conclude that HIV is an impairment that 
substantially limits a major life activity).
CCHMC's position is essentially that it could not 
accommodate a nurse who blacks out and becomes confused when 
treating and administering narcotics to critically ill children. 
Doc. No. 23, at 8. Elsewhere, CCHMC argues that Plaintiff 
presented a safety risk because she was still having the same 
medical issues that caused her to have practice problems and 
because she acknowledged that she stopped seeing her physicians 
to treat these problems. A reasonable juror could conclude, 
however, that CCHMC's assessment of the risk Plaintiff presented 
to patients was not reasonable and/or not based on the most 
current information. If Plaintiff were still having medical 
issues that might have caused her to have practice problems when 
she was released to return to work in September 2009, it was 
pointless for her to have gone through the fitness-for-duty 
evaluation in the first place and it makes even less sense that 
CCHMC would have concluded that she was fit to return to work in 
any capacity at the conclusion of it. It seems evident that some 
of the practice problems that allegedly precluded her return to 
the Critical Airway unit are not unique to that practice area.
For instance, accurately documenting patient charts and giving
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accurate patient briefs at the change of a shift would seemingly 
apply in every department. Similarly, if Plaintiff were still 
blacking out and experiencing confusion at work, she presumably 
would not have been able to work in any department at the 
hospital. CCHMC, nevertheless, saw fit to allow Plaintiff to 
work in other areas of the hospital. Indeed, CCHMC acknowledges 
in its brief that Plaintiff has worked in the Bone Marrow 
Transplant unit for two years without incident, Doc. No. 23, at 
10, which suggests Plaintiff no longer was experiencing 
significant medical issues when she returned from the fitness- 
for-duty evaluation and would not have experienced the black outs 
and confusion that caused her practice problems. Indeed, CCHMC 
states that the treatment that Plaintiff received during the 
fitness-for-duty evaluation was successful. Doc. No. 23, at 10. 
CCHMC tries to qualify this admission by stating that it was safe 
for Plaintiff to treat non-critically ill patients who do not 
require her to administer narcotic medications. CCHMC apparently 
overlooks its statements elsewhere, however, that Plaintiff 
currently administers narcotics in the Bone Marrow Transplant 
unit,6 and it seems to the Court that children who receive bone 
marrow transplants are gravely ill as well. Therefore, CCHMC in 
fact undermines its rationale that Plaintiff could not return to 
work in the Critical Airway unit because she was a safety threat.
6 Doc. No. 48-1, at 1 (Rodell Aff. 5 3)
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Additionally, a reasonable juror could conclude that 
CCHMC's determination that Plaintiff presented a health and 
safety risk was not based on the most current medical 
information. It may be true, as CCHMC alludes to in its brief, 
that at one point, Plaintiff told Ballinger that she had stopped 
seeing her doctors. Ballinger Dep. at 102-03. It is not evident 
specifically when Plaintiff made this statement, however. There 
is some evidence, though, that Plaintiff made statements to this 
effect several months before she returned to work, near the 
outset of the fitness-for-duty evaluation. See, Doc. No. 25-2, 
at 30 (Plaintiff's June 17, 2009 email to Ballinger stating that 
she is not going back to the doctor); see also Doc. No. 25-2, at 
17 (Dr. Miller's May 27, 2009 report). In fact, CCHMC had 
available more contemporary medical evidence that Plaintiff was 
actually still receiving medical treatment for her 
gastrointestinal condition. Specifically, in September 2009, her 
own physician released her back to work without any restrictions. 
Doc. No. 25-4, at 43. Similarly, CCHMC acknowledged in its 
September 10, 2009 report to the OBN that Plaintiff was still 
taking prescribed medications - evidence that CCHMC was aware 
that Plaintiff was in fact still being treated for her condition. 
Doc. No. 32-4, at 32. Moreover, CCHMC apparently gave little or 
no serious consideration to Plaintiff's contention that the 
Lotronex - and not opiod abuse - was the principal cause of her
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practice problems and that the risk of future similar practice 
problems would be significantly reduced or eliminated when she 
stopped taking Lotronex.
In short, a reasonable juror could conclude that CCHMC 
did not consider all of the currently available information in 
concluding that Plaintiff presented a health and safety risk if 
she returned to work in the Critical Airway unit. Consequently, 
CCHMC is not entitled to summary judgment on this affirmative 
defense.
For all of the reasons stated above, CCHMC's motion for 
summary judgment on Plaintiff's disability discrimination claims 
is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. To the extent that 
Plaintiff's disability discrimination claims are based on the 
initial decision to suspend her pending completion of a fitness- 
for-duty evaluation, CCHMC's motion for summary judgment is well- 
taken and is GRANTED. To the extent that Plaintiff's disability 
discrimination claims are based on CCHMC's decision to deny 
Plaintiff reinstatement to the Critical Airway unit, CCHMC's 
motion for summary judgment is not well-taken and is DENIED.
2. Failure to Accommodate
Plaintiff also claims that CCHMC violated the 
disability discrimination laws by failing to accommodate her 
disability and by failing to engage in the interactive process to 
find her a reasonable accommodation. The Court first notes,
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however, that to the extent that Plaintiff is proceeding under 
the "regarded as" prong of the ADA, pursuant to the ADAAA, an 
employer has no duty to accommodate an employee it regards as 
disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(e). This in 
fact was the law in this Circuit prior to the enactment of the 
ADAAA. Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 
1999). Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff is proceeding 
under the "regard as" definition of disability, CCHMC is entitled 
to summary judgment on her failure to accommodate claim.
To the extent that Plaintiff is proceeding under the 
actual disability or record of disability definitions, however, 
CCHMC is still entitled to summary judgment on her failure to 
accommodate claim. The Court agrees with CCHMC that when 
Plaintiff experienced confusion and black outs at work, there 
would have been no way for CCHMC to reasonably accommodate these 
conditions. It seems self-evident that there are no 
circumstances under which a nurse experiencing these problems can 
be safely or reasonably accommodated to treat patients.
To the extent that Plaintiff's failure to accommodate 
claim is based on events that occurred when she returned from the 
fitness-for-duty evaluation, it is not apparent that she actually 
needed any accommodations, except perhaps a need for continuing 
intermittent FMLA leave. Plaintiff's own physician released her 
to work with no restrictions at all in September 2009. Doc. No.
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25-4, at 43. Even Plaintiff indicated in her June 17, 2009 email 
to Ballinger that there was no medical reason she could not 
return to work. Doc. No. 25-2, at 30.
In any event, the employee bears the burden of 
proposing a reasonable accommodation, Monette, 90 F.3d at 1183, 
and there is no evidence in this record that Plaintiff ever 
proposed an accommodation to CCHMC when she completed the 
fitness-for-duty evaluation. Since Plaintiff never requested a 
reasonable accommodation, CCHMC had no duty to engage in an 
interactive process to find an accommodation for her. Breitfelder 
v. Leis, 151 Fed. Appx. 379, 385-86 (6th Cir. 2005); Lockard v. 
General Motors Corp., 52 Fed. Appx. 782, 788 (6th Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, CCHMC's motion for summary judgment on 
Plaintiff's failure to accommodate claim is well-taken and is 
GRANTED.
C. Retaliation
Plaintiff also claims that CCHMC violated the ADA and 
the Ohio Civil Rights Act by retaliating against her for engaging 
in protected activity. CCHMC argues that it is entitled to 
summary judgment on this claim because Plaintiff never engaged in 
any protected activity or, alternatively, because there is no 
causal connection between the protected activity and any adverse 
employment actions. The Court concludes that a reasonable juror 
probably could find that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity.
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As recounted earlier, Plaintiff objected in several emails to the 
entire fitness-for-duty process and stated in at least two of the 
emails that she felt like she was being discriminated against. 
Doc. No. 25-3, at 184; Doc. No. 25-2, at 31. Additionally, a few 
of her emails make reference to initiating legal proceedings 
against CCHMC. E.g., Doc. No. 25-2, at 23. In October 2009, one 
of Plaintiff's attorneys wrote a letter to CCHMC expressing 
concern that CCHMC was treating Plaintiff unfairly because of her 
"chronic illness" and her medication. Doc. No. 42-1, at 11. The 
Court nevertheless agrees that there is no evidence of a causal 
connection between the protected activity and any adverse 
employment actions.
The decision to suspend Plaintiff pending the fitness- 
for-duty evaluation preceded her protected activity. Therefore, 
there cannot have been a causal connection between these two 
events.
Moreover, there is no evidence of a causal connection 
between Plaintiff's protected activity and the decision not to 
reinstate her to the Critical Airway unit. As discussed 
extensively before, it appears that the reason that Plaintiff was 
not reinstated to the Critical Airway unit was her medical 
impairment. While, if true, this would constitute disability 
discrimination, it would not constitute retaliation. Indeed, the 
explicit reliance on Plaintiff's medical impairment to deny her
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reinstatement rather soundly defeats any contention that her 
protected activity played a part in the decision not to reinstate 
her. Additionally, the record shows that Mary Bellman worked 
assiduously to find another appropriate placement for Plaintiff. 
Terri Thrasher, who coordinated the fitness-for-duty process in 
the first place, hired Plaintiff to work in her flu clinic and 
gave Plaintiff a positive recommendation for other positions.
Doc. No. 25-6, at 3, 12. The record also shows that, except for 
reinstating Plaintiff to the Critical Airway unit, CCHMC worked 
cooperatively with Plaintiff's counsel to find her another 
appropriate full-time position. See Doc. No. 25-6, at 23-27. A 
reasonable juror simply could not find based on this record that 
CCHMC retaliated against Plaintiff for engaging in protected 
activity. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 
133, 148 (2000).
Accordingly, CCHMC's motion for summary judgment on 
Plaintiff's disability retaliation claims is well-taken and is 
GRANTED.
B. FMLA Interference Claims
There are two types of FMLA interference claims. The 
first is an entitlement claim in which the employer fails to 
provide the employee with entitlements provided by the FMLA, such 
as reinstatement after taking medical leave. Edgar v. JAC Prod., 
Inc., 443 F.3d 501, 507 (6th Cir. 2006). The second is a
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retaliation claim in which the employer retaliates against the 
employee for having exercised his or her rights under the FMLA. 
Id. at 508. Plaintiff alleges both types of claims in this case.
1. Interference
Under the FMLA, a qualifying employee is entitled to 
twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year if she has a serious health 
condition which renders her unable to perform the essential 
functions of her position. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Moreover, 
the FMLA makes it "unlawful for any employer to interfere with, 
restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any 
right provided under this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a). One 
of the rights embodied in the FMLA is the employee's right to 
return to her former position, or to an equivalent position, upon 
her return from FMLA leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). However, in 
order to be entitled to restoration, the employee must return to 
work before the expiration of the twelve week leave period and be 
able to perform all of the essential functions of her job.
Edgar, 443 F.3d at 506; Hoge v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 384 F.3d 
238, 245-46 (6th Cir. 2004). To prevail under an FMLA 
interference theory, the employee must establish the following 
elements:
1) she is an "eligible employee";
2) the defendant is an "employer";
3) the employee was entitled to leave under the FMLA,
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4) the employee gave the employer notice of her 
intention to take leave,
5) the employer denied the employee FMLA benefits to 
which she was entitled.
Wvsong v. Dow Chemical Co., 503 F.3d 441, 447 (6th Cir. 2007). 
Plaintiff alleges that CCHMC violated her FMLA right to 
restoration to her position in the Critical Airway unit when she 
returned from leave. CCHMC contends that Plaintiff was not 
entitled to restoration because her twelve weeks of leave had 
expired by the time she returned to work. Thus, for purposes of 
the present motion only the first and fifth elements are at 
issue.
The record shows that as of June 4, 2009, Plaintiff had 
286 hours of FMLA leave available. Doc. No. 25-5, at 36.
Assuming a 40 hour work week, Plaintiff's had available about 
seven weeks of FMLA leave, which would have been exhausted 
approximately July 24, 2009. Thus, as CCHMC argues, by September 
2009 Plaintiff's FMLA leave had expired and, as consequence, at 
that particular time she would not have been entitled to 
restoration to her former position. Plaintiff points out, 
however, that Dr. Baum cleared her to return to work on July 7, 
2009, before the expiration of the twelve week period. CCHMC, on 
the other hand, points out that both Dr. Miller and Barry Cobb 
reported that Plaintiff should be closely monitored when she 
returned work and that it would not have been possible to closely
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monitor Plaintiff while she was performing her job. In other 
words, CCHMC contends that Plaintiff was not entitled to 
restoration on July 7, 2009 because she could not perform all of 
the essential functions of her job at that time. The Court 
concludes, however, that there is a material issue of fact 
whether Plaintiff could perform all of the essential functions of 
her job before the expiration of her FMLA leave. Therefore, 
summary judgment in favor of CCHMC on Plaintiff's FMLA 
interference claim is not appropriate.
As Plaintiff correctly argues, as of July 7, 2009 Dr. 
Baum, who at that point was Plaintiff's treating substance abuse 
counseling provider, stated that she could return to work 
immediately and, moreover, that there was nothing about the 
ongoing counseling that would preclude her from returning to 
work. Dr. Baum placed no other conditions on her return to work 
and, in fact, recommended terminating counseling immediately if 
Plaintiff passed three drug tests. The Court recognizes that 
CCHMC was presented with opinions from Dr. Miller and Dr. Cobb 
stating that Plaintiff should be closely monitored but there is 
nothing in the record that indicates that CCHMC was required to 
accept those opinions over Dr. Baum's opinion. A juror might 
reasonably conclude that the opinion of Dr. Baum, who was 
actually treating Plaintiff at the time, was a more accurate 
evaluation of Plaintiff's ability to perform all of the functions
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of her former position, as opposed to those opinions which were 
based upon a one-time examination of Plaintiff.
The Court also recognizes that Plaintiff was a party to 
the return to work agreement which established certain conditions 
that would allow her to resume nursing a CCHMC. An employer, 
however, may not require an employee to take more leave than is 
necessary to address the medical circumstances for which leave 
was taken. Hoge, 384 F.3d at 247; 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(c). 
Moreover, employees cannot waive their rights under the FMLA and 
an employer may not induce or coerce employees into waiving their 
FMLA rights. Id. at 252; 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d). Reading these 
two rules together it becomes apparent to the Court that if in 
fact Plaintiff was able to perform all of the essential functions 
of her job on July 7, 2009, as Dr. Baum indicated in his letter,
then CCHMC could not avoid liability for not reinstating 
Plaintiff to her position by relying on the return to work 
agreement.
In summary, there is a conflict in the evidence whether 
Plaintiff was able to perform the essential functions of her 
position, and thus entitled to restoration, before her FMLA leave 
expired. Accordingly, CCHMC's motion for summary judgment on 
Plaintiff's FMLA interference claim is not well-taken and is 
DENIED.
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2. Retaliation
Plaintiff also alleges that CCHMC retaliated against 
her for taking FMLA leave. In order to prevail on an FMLA 
retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that 1) she availed 
herself of a protected right under the FMLA by notifying the 
employer of her intent to take leave, 2) she suffered an adverse 
employment action, and 3) that there is a causal connection 
between the exercise of her rights under the FMLA and the adverse 
employment action. Edgar, 443 F.3d at 508. If the plaintiff 
establishes these elements, the burden shifts to the employer to 
proffer a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for discharging the 
employee. Id. If the employer carries this burden, the 
plaintiff must show that the reasons advanced by the employer are 
pretextual. Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d 
309, 316 (6th Cir. 2001). On this record, no reasonable juror 
could conclude that there is a causal connection between any of 
the adverse employment actions and Plaintiff's exercise of her 
rights under the FMLA.
First, Plaintiff had been on intermittent FMLA leave 
for over a year at the time she was suspended in May 2009. In 
addition she had taken about a month of continuous FMLA leave in 
November 2008. Plaintiff was not subjected to any adverse 
employment consequences at all during this year-long period. 
Therefore, any temporal connection between her use of FMLA leave
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and the decision to suspend her is tenuous at best. See, e.q., 
Anderson v. Avon Products, Inc., 340 Fed. Appx. 284, 288 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (no causal connection where six months separated the 
plaintiff's use of FMLA leave and the adverse employment action).
Second, the record almost indisputably establishes that 
the decision to suspend Plaintiff was precipitated by her unusual 
behavior in April and May 2009. Even Plaintiff admits that she 
blacked out and became confused at work and at the time was 
takinq medication that could cause serious neuroloqical side 
effects. In light of those compelling facts, no juror could 
conclude that retaliation was the motive for suspendinq 
Plaintiff.
Third, no reasonable juror could conclude that 
retaliation was the reason that CCHMC did not allow Plaintiff to 
return to work earlier or restore her to her position in the 
Critical Airway unit. Initially, the Court notes that CCHMC 
actually required Plaintiff to use her available FMLA leave 
during the fitness-for-duty evaluation. It seems highly unlikely 
that an employer would require an employee to use FMLA leave to 
address a serious medical condition and then retaliate against 
that employee for having done so. Moreover, the record rather 
plainly demonstrates that all of CCHMC's actions during this 
period were driven by the perhaps erroneous conclusion that 
Plaintiff was abusing opiods and was in denial about her
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substance abuse problem. As regrettable as that conclusion was, 
it was a conclusion not related to Plaintiff's use of FMLA leave. 
Similarly, the record rather plainly demonstrates that the 
decision not to reinstate Plaintiff to the Critical Airway unit 
was an erroneous belief that Plaintiff had stopped seeking 
treatment for her medical problems. Again, however, even if this 
conclusion was erroneous, it is a reason unrelated to Plaintiff's 
use of FMLA leave. Finally, as already discussed, the record 
shows that CCHMC worked diligently to find another placement for 
Plaintiff once she returned from FMLA leave - behavior that 
substantially dissipates any inference of a retaliatory motive.
Based on this record, a reasonable juror could not 
conclude that CCHMC retaliated against Plaintiff for exercising 
her rights under the FMLA. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). Accordingly, CCHMC's motion for
summary judgment on Plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim is well- 
taken and is GRANTED.
C. Defamation
Plaintiff alleges that CCHMC defamed her in September 
2009 by providing the OBN an incomplete and misleading report
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which implied she was a controlled substance abuser.7 A 
defamation claim has four elements:
1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
2) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part 
of the publisher; and
4) either actionability of the statement irrespective 
of special harm or the existence of special harm 
caused by the publication.
Akron-Canton Waste Oil, Inc. v. Safety-Kleen Oil Serv., Inc., 611 
N.E.2d 955, 962 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (citing Restatement (Second) 
of Torts 155, Section 558 (1977)). CCHMC denies that it defamed
Plaintiff in its report to the OBN, but argues in any event that 
its statements about Plaintiff were protected by both common law 
and statutory privilege. The Court agrees with CCHMC that, at a 
minimum, its report to the OBN is protected by statutory 
privilege.
Section 4723.341 of the Ohio Revised Code provides:
In the absence of fraud or bad faith, no person 
reporting to the board of nursing or testifying in an 
adjudication conducted under Chapter 119 of the Revised 
Code with regard to alleged incidents of negligence or
7 Plaintiff originally alleged that CCHMC defamed her in 
a substance abuse training session by using her as an example of 
a nurse who was abusing controlled substances. The record is 
clear at this point, however, that this defamation claim not only 
occurred outside of the limitations period, but was also based on 
inadmissible hearsay statements. Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Job & 
Family Serv., 763 N.E.2d 1238, 1241 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); see 
infra, at 42-43. Plaintiff has apparently abandoned this 
incident as the basis of her defamation claim.
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malpractice or matters subject to this chapter or 
sections 3123.41 to 3123.50 of the Revised Code and any 
applicable rules adopted under section 3123.63 of the 
Revised Code shall be subject to either of the 
following based on making the report or testifying:
(1) Liability in damages in a civil action for injury, 
death, or loss to person or property;
(2) Discipline or dismissal by an employer.
Ohio Rev. Code § 4723.641(B). CCHMC's September 2009 follow-up
report to the OBN clearly was in regard to incidents which
indicated that Plaintiff's ability to practice safely was
impaired and, therefore, is privileged unless there is sufficient
evidence of fraud or bad faith. See Ohio Rev. Code §
4723.34(A)(1) and Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4723.28(B)(10) & (11)
(collectively requiring employers of nurses to report to the OBN
conduct indicating that a nurse's ability to practice safely is
impaired by excessive use of drugs, alcohol, or other chemical
substances or when nurse's ability to practice safely is impaired
because of physical or mental disability). Plaintiff's brief
fails to point to any evidence suggesting that CCHMC's report to
the OBN, although perhaps inaccurate and misleading, was made in
bad faith or with some fraudulent intent. Having reviewed the
entire record, the Court concludes that there is no evidence of
fraud or bad faith on the part of CCHMC in making this report.
Therefore, the report was privileged under § 4723.341.
Accordingly, CCHMC's motion for summary judgment on
Plaintiff's defamation claim is well-taken and is GRANTED.
41
Case: 1:10-cv-00619-SSB-SKB Doc #: 50 Filed: 02/15/12 Page: 42 of 44 PAGEID #: <pageID>
D. Invasion of Privacy
Finally, Plaintiff asserts a claim against CCHMC for 
invasion of privacy. The elements of an invasion of privacy 
claim are:
1) there was publicity about the individual the 
disclosure must be of a public nature, not private;
2) the facts disclosed concerned an individual's 
private life, not her public life;
3) the matter publicized would be highly offensive and 
objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities;
4) the publication was made intentionally, not 
negligently; and
5) the matter publicized was not of legitimate concern 
to the public;
Curry v. Village of Blanchester, Nos. CA2009-08-010, CA2009-08- 
012, 2010 WL 2807948, at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. July 19, 2010). 
Plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim is specifically based on 
the training session which allegedly implied that Plaintiff was 
abusing controlled substances. Doc. No. 38, at 37-38.
As already indicated, and as CCHMC correctly argues, 
Plaintiff cannot prevail on this claim because it is based on 
hearsay. The only evidence that anyone implicated Plaintiff as a 
substance abuser in a training session is Plaintiff's testimony 
that another nurse, Amy Ross, told her that during a training 
exercise a speaker referred to a nurse with a PICC line who had 
been abusing drugs. Plaint. Dep. at 123-24. Plaintiff also
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claims that other unidentified employees told her than this 
statement was made in the training session. Id. Plaintiff, 
however, has no witness with firsthand knowledge that these 
allegedly intrusive comments were made. Her own testimony, of 
course, is hearsay and inadmissible to establish this claim.
U.S. Structures, Inc. v. J.P. Structures, Inc., 130 F.3d 1185, 
1189 (6th Cir. 1997) (in ruling on a motion for summary judgment 
"hearsay evidence . . . must be disregarded.").
Accordingly, CCHMC's motion for summary judgment on 
Plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim is well-taken and is 
GRANTED.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated in this order, Defendant 
Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center's motion for 
summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. To the
extent that Plaintiff's disability discrimination claims are 
based on the decision to suspend her pending a fitness-for-duty 
evaluation, the motion for summary judgment is well-taken and is 
GRANTED. To the extent that Plaintiff's disability 
discrimination claims are based on the decision not to restore 
her to her former position in the Critical Airway unit, the 
motion for summary judgment is not well-taken and is DENIED. To 
the extent that Plaintiff's disability discrimination claims are 
based on an alleged failure to accommodate, the motion for
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summary judgment is well-taken and is GRANTED. To the extent 
Plaintiff alleges that CCHMC retaliated against her in violation 
of the disability discrimination statutes, the motion for summary 
judgment is well-taken and is GRANTED.
To the extent Plaintiff alleges that CCHMC violated the 
FMLA by not reinstating her to the Critical Airway unit, the 
motion for summary judgment is not well-taken and is DENIED. To 
the extent that Plaintiff alleges that CCHMC retaliated against 
her for taking FMLA leave or exercising other FMLA rights, the 
motion for summary judgment is well-taken and is GRANTED.
CCHMC's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's 
defamation and invasion of privacy claims is well-taken and is 
GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Date February 14, 2012 ________s/Sandra S. Beckwith_______
Sandra S. Beckwith 
Senior United States District Judge
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